The (not so) Great Game in Syria

The Great Game was first coined to describe the rivalry between the British and Russian empires, which played out in Central Asia, but it can just as well refer to any situation where big powers fight a proxy war on someone else's land. And the most recent case is Syria, where Sunnis and Shiites from the Gulf (led by Saudi Arabia and Iran, respectively) fight their proxy war to control Islam.

The Situation 

Syria is ruled by a Shiite Alawite minority, led by the Assad family. The country's political and military elite is made up of mostly this sect. Sunni minority started peaceful demonstrations about a year ago, and has been repressed violently by the regime. The situation evolved slowly into an armed struggle between the minority, supported by Gulf states and others, and the army, whose main weapon is  massacres of civilians.

The Players

• The rebels - a coalition of many factions and fractions of Syrian minorities, including some extremists and religions fanatics. 
• Iran - Iran is the benefactor of US mistakes under Bush, which spent upward of a trillion dollars to dispose of Sadam Hussein and bring Iraq under Shiite rule and Iranian influence. The Iranian took advantage of these errors to become a regional superpower. Syria is Iran's gate to the Mediterranean, its conduit of arm sales and smuggling to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, and its influence in Lebanon. Iran, in case anyone forgot, is a Shiite state, ruled autocratically by Ayatollahs, or religions leaders.
• Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states - Sunni centers of powers, interested in reducing the influence of Iran in the area, these countries are populated by some of the same tribes that are being oppressed and massacred in Syria. They support the resistance to Assad with money, weapons, training and political support.
• Turkey - another Sunni state vying for regional leadership with Iran. A former ally of Syria, it severed relations after it became clear that Assad's repression and killing of civilian are a dead end. Turkey hosts Syrian refugees, offers political support, military training, and facilitates weapons flow to the rebels, while also providing them with sanctuary. Turkey is interested in political influence in the area, but also cooperates with the US and EU, both as member of NATO and because of its affinity to Europe.
• The US and EU - partly for humanitarian reasons, partly to contain Iran's nuclear ambitions and its spreading and corrosive influence in the area, this bloc provides political support and logistic coordination to the rebels. Their main concern is the fact that nobody knows the real positions and intent of the rebels.
• Russia and China - support Assad for various reasons unrelated to the conflict. Syria provides Russia with its only Mediterranean port, relies on Russian weapon systems which are a lucrative trade, and has been trained by the Russian military for many years. Some of the Russian actions are meant to embarrass the west and maintain Russian influence in the area. 
• Israel - Israel is hesitant to commit to either side. For one, they are not sure whether Assad or the oppositions is the preferred cross-border neighbor. Assad is a known entity, and has maintained border stability for over 40 years, at the same time arming and training Hezbollah. On the other hand, severing Iran's access to Lebanon will lead to the likely collapse of armed groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas. An explicit Israeli  involvement in support of the rebels will backfire on both the rebels and Israel, so its actions are likely to be kept secret.
• Al Qaeda - Iraqi Sunnis which escaped Iraq during the violent years after the US invasion live all over Syria. This allows Iraqi militants a relatively easy access to the country. Al Qaeda and it affiliates benefit from the conflict in a number of ways - improved favorability in the Arab world for supporting a popular cause, increased fund-raising, and legitimacy as part of the Sunni paramilitary infrastructure.

What to Expect

• Continuing conflict - Assad has no place to go at the moment, so his only option is to repress the majority of the population through army-led and Alawite militia massacres. On the other hand, killing civilians will not quell the uprising, and he can only kill so many of them - not enough to win.
• With time, defections and loss of personnel will wear down the regime, while rebels will get stronger as their training takes effect and as more of the population begins to support them. In other words, time is not in Assad favor.
• Russia and China will suffer political damage from their support of a murderous, oppressive regime, and business losses through the influence of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Sooner or later, they will support a solution that will ease Assad out.

Interesting Points

• The rebels seem disciplined, suggesting an evolving political and organizational skills and central control. They focus their actions on fighting the Syrian military and are not engaging in the much easier massacre of the Alawite sect and wealthy merchants. Or at least this is how it seems from the outside.
• The trend seems to show improvement in the rebels' skills, due to training and organizational support, funding and probably military support by external sources.
• So far, the West is carefully controlling their support. They provide small arms and antitank missiles. Their aversion to providing anti-aircraft missiles is probably due to their fear of arming Al Qaeda and other extremist organizations. This allows the Syrian army to use helicopter gunships to attack civilians and rebels alike. When the anti-aircraft capability show up, it would be interesting to note whether they are in the hand of the rebels, or used through special forces from the Gulf, EU, US or Israel.
• At some point, the minority Alawites, Christians and business elite might come to the conclusion that getting rid of Assad is in their interest. When this happens, it will signal the end. The only way Assad can prevent this from happening is a military victory that will marginalize the rebels, and soon. So it would not be surprising to see a final major effort and an all out attack by regime forces. However, their chances of success are limited.

Conclusion

More bloodshed, more pain, and slow slog towards regime change, which at this point is inevitable, are going to play out in the coming months and years.